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CHAPTER XV.
Of Paternal, Political, and Despotical Power, considered together.
Sect. 169. THOUGH I have had occasion to speak of
these separately before, yet the great mistakes of late about government,
having, as I suppose, arisen from confounding these distinct powers one
with another, it may not, perhaps, be amiss to consider them here
together.
Sect. 170. First, then, Paternal or
parental power is nothing but that which parents have over their
children, to govern them for the children's good, till they come to the
use of reason, or a state of knowledge, wherein they may be supposed
capable to understand that rule, whether it be the law of nature, or the
municipal law of their country, they are to govern themselves by: capable,
I say, to know it, as well as several others, who live as freemen under
that law. The affection and tenderness which God hath planted in the
breast of parents towards their children, makes it evident, that this is
not intended to be a severe arbitrary government, but only for the help,
instruction, and preservation of their offspring. But happen it as it
will, there is, as I have proved, no reason why it should be thought to
extend to life and death, at any time, over their children, more than over
any body else; neither can there be any pretence why this parental
power should keep the child, when grown to a man, in subjection to
the will of his parents, any farther than having received life and
education from his parents, obliges him to respect, honour, gratitude,
assistance and support, all his life, to both father an d mother. And
thus, 'tis true, the paternal is a natural government,
but not at all extending itself to the ends and jurisdictions of that
which is political. The power of the father doth not reach at
all to the property of the child, which is only in his own disposing.
Sect. 171. Secondly, Political power is
that power, which every man having in the state of nature, has given up
into the hands of the society, and therein to the governors, whom the
society hath set over itself, with this express or tacit trust, that it
shall be employed for their good, and the preservation of their property:
now this power, which every man has in the state of
nature, and which he parts with to the society in all such cases
where the soc iety can secure him, is to use such means, for the
preserving of his own property, as he thinks good, and nature allows him;
and to punish the breach of the law of nature in others, so as (according
to the best of his reason) may most conduce to the prese rvation of
himself, and the rest of mankind. So that the end and measure of this
power, when in every man's hands in the state of nature, being the
preservation of all of his society, that is, all mankind in general, it
can have no other end or measure, when in the hands of
the magistrate, but to preserve the members of that society in their
lives, liberties, and possessions; and so cannot be an absolute, arbitrary
power over their lives and fortunes, which are as much as possi ble to be
preserved; but a power to make laws, and annex such
penalties to them, as may tend to the preservation of the whole,
by cutting off those parts, and those only, which are so corrupt, that
they threaten the sound and healthy, without which no severity is lawful.
And this power has its original only from compact and agreement,
and the mutual consent of those who make up the community.
Sect. 172. Thirdly, Despotical power is
an absolute, arbitrary power one man has over another, to take away his
life, whenever he pleases. This is a power, which neither nature gives,
for it has made no such distinction between one man and another; nor
compact can convey: for man not having such an arbitrary power over his
own life, cannot give another man such a power over it; but it is the
effect only of forfeiture, which the aggressor makes of his own
life, when he puts himself into the state of war with another: for having
quitted reason, which God hath given to be the rule betwixt man and man,
and the common bond whereby human kind is united into one fellowship and
society; and having renounced the way of peace which that teaches, and
made use of the force of war, to compass his unjust ends upon another,
where he has no right; and so revolting from his own kind to that of
beasts, by making force, which is their's, to be his rule of right, he
renders himself liable to be destroyed by the injured person, and the rest
of mankind, that will join with him in the execution of justice, as any
other wild beast, or noxious brute, with whom mankind can have neither
society nor security*. And thus captives, taken in a just and
lawful war, and such only, are subject to a despotical power,
which, as it arises not from compact, so neither is it capable of any, but
is the state of war continued: for what compact can be made with a man
that is not master of his own life? what condition can he perform? and if
he be once allowed to be master of his own life, the despotical,
arbitrary power of his master ceases. He that is master of himself,
and his own life, has a right too to the means of preserving it; so that
as soon as compact enters, slavery ceases, and he so far quits
his absolute power, and puts an end to the state of war, who enters into
conditions with his captive.
(*Another copy corrected by Mr. Locke, has it thus, Noxious
brute that is destructive to their being.)
Sect. 173. Nature gives the first of
these, viz. paternal power to parents for the benefit of their
children during their minority, to supply their want of ability, and
understanding how to manage their property . (By property I must
be understood here, as in other places, to mean that property which men
have in their persons as well as goods.) Voluntary agreement
gives the second, viz. political power to governors for the
benefit of their subjects, to secure them in the possession and use of
their properties. And forfeiture gives the third despotical
power to lords for their own benefit, over those who are stripped of
all property.
Sect. 174. He, that shall consider the distinct
rise and extent, and the different ends of these several powers, will
plainly see, that paternal power comes as far short of that of
the magistrate, as despotical exceeds it; and that
absolute dominion, however placed, is so far from being one kind
of civil society, that it is as inconsistent with it, as slavery is with
property. Paternal power is only where minority makes the child
incapable to manage his property; political, where men have
property in their own disposal; and despotical, over such as have
no property at all.
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The text digitized by Dave Gowan.
John Locke's "Second Treatise of Government" was published in 1690. The complete unabridged text has been republished several times in edited
commentaries. This is based on the paperback book, "John Locke Second Treatise of Government", Edited, with an Introduction, By C.B. McPherson, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1980. None of the McPherson edition is included in the Etext; only the original words contained in the 1690 Locke text is included. The 1690 edition text is free of copyright.
This text is in the PUBLIC DOMAIN, posted to Wiretap 1 Jul 94.
©Copyright, 2000, Mike Rosenberg
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